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A PROPOSAL TO CHANGE SENTENCING APPEALS IN ARKANSAS
Anthony L. McMullen, J.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following: a jury finds a defendant guilty of a Class Y
felony, which carries a potential sentence of ten to forty years or life in prison on the first offense.1 Because this is Arkansas, the jury hears evidence
relevant to sentencing. The prosecutor seeks a long term of imprisonment
and is willing to say and do anything necessary to see it happen. And the
judge, who does not want to be perceived as being “soft on crime,” lets the
prosecutor proceed unfettered over the defendant’s vehement objections.
The jury then deliberates. Before the sentencing phase, the jury was inclined
to give the defendant the minimum sentence of ten years. After hearing the
prosecutor’s closing argument, the jury is so fearful that it finds a thirty-year
sentence more appropriate. On appeal, the defendant raises his objections
again. No matter how meritorious the defendant’s arguments may be, he will
not be able to get past one strange rule: “A defendant who has received a
sentence less than the maximum sentence for the offense cannot show prejudice from the sentence itself.”2 Because of this maxim, the most egregious
prosecutorial misconduct during the sentencing phase may go unchecked if
the jury sentences the defendant to anything less than the maximum.
A review of Arkansas case law reveals a lack of logic in adopting this
rule. Further, Arkansas appears to be unique among the states that use jury
sentencing in holding that a criminal defendant cannot establish prejudice
from anything short of a maximum sentence. This brief article will review
the history of sentencing appeals in Arkansas. It will then compare Arkansas’s current law to other states that have jury sentencing in non-capital cases. Finally, it will present an argument for overruling this precedent and
adopting a better approach for reviewing allegations of error as it relates to
the sentence.

*
Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Central Arkansas; Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law;
former law clerk to the Honorable Wendell L. Griffen, Arkansas Court of Appeals and the
Honorable Waymond M. Brown, Arkansas Court of Appeals.
1. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2018).
2. E.g., State v. Franklin, 351 Ark. 131, 142, 89 S.W.3d 865, 870 (2002).
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II. SENTENCING APPEALS IN THE MID-20TH CENTURY
Before 1987, the Supreme Court of Arkansas appeared not to require a
maximum sentence before granting sentencing relief. There are three cases
from the 1970s involving erroneous application of the habitual offender
statute, which provides enhanced penalties for multiple offenders. In Richards v. State,3 the court ruled that the trial court erred by having the jury
consider an improperly certified out-of-state conviction. This error affected
the sentence only.4 Therefore, the court gave the Attorney General the
choice of consenting to the sentence being reduced to the minimum for the
crime or having the judgment reversed and the case remanded for a new
trial.5 The court cited no cases to support its holding.6 However, it relied on
Richards in two subsequent cases. In Roach v. State,7 the court ruled that the
trial court erred in admitting a conviction without proof that the offense was
punishable by imprisonment in the Arkansas penitentiary. The court reduced
appellant’s sentence to the minimum “to remove all possibility of any prejudicial effect to the appellant.”8 Again, the Attorney General had the choice
of accepting this sentence or having the case remanded for a new trial.9
In 1976, the state supreme court considered Rogers v. State.10 There, a
jury convicted appellant of burglary.11 The State sought to increase his sentence under the habitual offender statute.12 However, the court found that
two of appellant’s five convictions were inadmissible.13 This rendered the
relevant subdivision of the habitual offender statute inapplicable.14 The court
then commented as to the effect on the sentence:
When cumulated with appellant’s instant conviction the language of s
43—2328(3) becomes applicable. This section makes mandatory the imposition of the maximum term of imprisonment, 21 years, against one
falling within its ambit. It additionally provides that a multiplier may be
used to lengthen this term, and it is clear that the jury, in sentencing appellant to a 31 1/2-year term of imprisonment, thus increased the period
of incarceration by use of this device. However, because we cannot ascertain beyond speculative persuasion what role the inadmissible convic3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Richards v. State, 254 Ark. 760, 498 S.W.2d 1 (1973).
Id.
Id. at 761, 498 S.W.2d at 2.
See generally id.
Roach v. State, 255 Ark. 773, 503 S.W.2d 467 (1973).
Id. at 779, 503 S.W.2d at 471.
Id., 503 S.W. 2d at 471.
Rogers v. State, 260 Ark. 232, 538 S.W.2d 300 (1976).
Id. at 233, 538 S.W.2d at 301.
Id., 538 S.W.2d at 301.
Id. at 236, 538 S.W.2d at 303.
Id., 538 S.W.2d at 303.
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tion played in enhancing appellant’s sentence and because the potential
for prejudice is thereby engendered, we reduce this sentence to the minimum permissible term, or 21 years. 15

Again, the Attorney General had the choice of accepting the reduced
sentence or retrying the appellant.16
So, the law at this point appeared clear: when there was trial error that
related to the sentence only, the Supreme Court of Arkansas gave the Attorney General the choice of accepting a modified sentence or retrying the
case. In addition to the aforementioned cases, this result can be seen in the
1963 case Osborne v. State,17 where the trial court erroneously refused to
instruct the jury not to consider a prior bad act for the purposes of enhancing
an appellant’s sentence; the 1972 case Wilburn v. State,18 where the trial
court erred in allowing the prosecutor to read into evidence a certified record of a prior conviction when that record failed to show that the appellant
was represented by counsel or waived his right to counsel; and the 1985 case
Meadows v. State,19 where the appellant was convicted of manslaughter of a
viable fetus, though such was not within the purview of the manslaughter
statute at the time.20 Language in Meadows is particularly instructive:
Appellant’s final point is that his conviction for the manslaughter of
Randy Waldrip must be reversed because of the prejudice caused by the
evidence adduced in the jointly tried case involving the viable fetus. Indubitably, some of the evidence concerning the fetus could have inflamed the jury. The State introduced evidence concerning the viability
of the fetus at various stages of gestation, and then presented detailed evidence about the death of the fetus as a result of “slow asphyxiation”
caused by a “shearing” of the umbilical cord, much like an astronaut
might die in outer space if he lost his “lifeline” to his orbiting space vehicle. Under A.R.E. Rule 401, such a vivid and detailed explanation of
the death of the fetus was neither relevant, nor properly admissible, in
the Waldrip case. However, the erroneous evidence would not have influenced the jury on the question of guilt or innocence, but could have
improperly influenced the jury in fixing the sentence. Because of this
possible prejudice in the fixing of the sentence, we affirm the judgment
of conviction but reduce the sentence to the minimum the jury could

15. Id., 538 S.W.2d at 303.
16. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d at 303.
17. Osborne v. State, 237 Ark. 5, 237 S.W.2d 170 (1963).
18. Wilburn v. State, 253 Ark. 608, 487 S.W.2d 600 (1972).
19. Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 722 S.W.2d 584 (1987).
20. The law has since changed. See Ark. Act 1273 of 1999 (codified at Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-1-102) (expanding the definition of “person,” for the purpose of the homicide statutes, to
include “a living fetus of twelve (12) weeks or greater gestation.”).
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have set for the offense of which the appellant was convicted.21

It also is helpful to consider the 1980 Arkansas Court of Appeals’ decision in Philmon v. State.22 There the trial court committed two evidentiary
errors. The court of appeals found that the errors were harmless as it related
to the appellant’s guilt, but it reduced the appellant’s sentence due to the
inadmissible evidence possibly influencing the jury on sentencing.23
III. YOUNG V. STATE AND BUCKLEY V. STATE: A CHANGE FOR THE WORSE
The change in the law started in 1985 with Young v. State.24 There, the
appellant was convicted of rape.25 At the time the appellant committed the
crime, rape was a Class A felony, punishable by a term of imprisonment of
between five and fifty years. The statute was later amended to make rape a
Class Y felony, punishable by a term between ten to forty years. In a petition for post-conviction relief, the appellant argued that the State had improperly tried and punished him for a Class Y felony.26 The Supreme Court
of Arkansas stated that, had the appellant raised the issue, he would have
been entitled to a jury instruction on rape as a Class A felony.27 But the court
held that, because his fourteen-year sentence fell within the range for both
Class A and Class Y felonies, the appellant could not show any prejudice
from this error.28 The supreme court provided no citation to support the conclusion, and nothing in the opinion indicates that the court considered the
possibility that the jury could have handed down a sentence somewhere between five and ten years imprisonment (less than the minimum for a Class Y
felony, but above the then minimum for a Class A felony). 29 Young still
represents the starting point for the increased difficulty in appeals from a
sentence in Arkansas.
The supreme court relied on Young when reviewing the sentence in
Buckley v. State.30 There, the appellant had previously received two life sentences for two counts of delivery of a controlled substance, but he appealed
and received a new trial on sentencing.31 The appellant wanted to waive his
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Meadows, 291 Ark. at 112, 722 S.W.2d at 587–88.
Philmon v. State, 267 Ark. 1121, 593 S.W.2d 504 (Ark. App. 1980).
Id. at 1127, 593 S.W.2d at 508.
Young v. State, 287 Ark. 361, 699 S.W.2d 398 (1985) (per curiam).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 67, 76 S.W.3d 825, 833–34 (2002).
Id. at 60, 76 S.W.3d at 829.
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right to a jury trial, but the State objected, and a new jury sentenced him to
two consecutive twenty-eight-year terms of imprisonment.32 The appellant
challenged the trial court’s decision to try him in front of a jury, but the
supreme court held that the Arkansas Code explicitly authorized such a procedure.33 After so holding, the court continued:
Additionally, Buckley cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by being resentenced by a new jury, because he received a sentence within the
statutory range, and one that was significantly less than his original sentence. Delivery of a controlled substance is a Class Y felony, . . . which
carries a sentencing range of ten-to-forty years or life. A defendant who
has received a sentence within the statutory range short of the maximum
sentence cannot show prejudice from the sentence itself. See Young v.
State, 287 Ark. 361, 699 S.W.2d 398 (1985).34

The appellant also sought review of several evidentiary issues and
claimed prejudice due to him receiving a sentence greater than the statutory
minimum. In addition to finding that his claim was not preserved for appellate review, the court relied on Young and stated that he still could not show
prejudice due to being sentenced to less than the maximum.
Four years later, the supreme court cited Young in Tate v. State.35
There, the alleged error was introducing pictures depicting the victim’s life
during the sentencing phase of trial.36 While there is language in the opinion
suggesting that the court would have ruled against the appellant on the merits of the argument,37 the court declined to review the argument due to the
appellant receiving a forty-year sentence (less than the maximum sentence
of life imprisonment for first-degree murder).38
The supreme court seems steadfast in preserving this rule. In State v.
Thompson,39 the State sought to reverse post-conviction relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel.40 The defendant was convicted of two counts of
second-degree sexual assault and one count of rape.41 The jury imposed sen32. Id., 76 S.W.3d at 829.
33. Id. at 69, 76 S.W.3d at 835.
34. Id. at 64, 76 S.W.3d at 832 (internal footnote reference and statutory citations omitted).
35. Tate v. State, 367 Ark. 576, 242 S.W.3d 254 (2006).
36. Id. at 577, 242 S.W.3d at 256.
37. “In Hicks v. State, 327 Ark. 727, 940 S.W.2d 855 (1997), this court affirmed the trial
court’s admission of a series of photographs during the penalty phase which was much more
extensive and detailed than the series in question here[.]” Tate, 367 Ark. at 583, 242 S.W.3d
at 261.
38. Id., 242 S.W.3d at 261.
39. State v. Thompson, 2017 Ark. 50, 510 S.W.3d 775.
40. Id. at 1, 510 S.W.3d at 776.
41. Id. at 2, 510 S.W.3d at 777.
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tences that were less than the maximum.42 After the court affirmed the convictions on appeal, the defendant sought post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.43 Some of the arguments directly related to
errors during the sentencing phase. The trial court granted the defendant’s
petition and specifically referenced alleged errors related to the sentence.44
The supreme court reversed, explaining “We have held that a sentence less
than the maximum sentence for an offense cannot show prejudice from the
sentence itself. . . . As appellee was sentenced to less than the maximum on
all charges, there must be something more than the sentence received in
order for him to demonstrate prejudice.”45 However, Justice Hart dissented:
[T]he majority applies a prejudice standard that precludes a defendant
from establishing prejudice from the sentence itself if the defendant receives a discretionary sentence of less than the maximum. Again, without knowing what the jury considered, this standard is virtually impossible to meet. We have never explained our reason for adopting the draconian standard. As one commentator has noted, “The only plausible explanation for these heightened standards is to help dispose of (i.e., deny)
many ineffective assistance claims.” . . . The United States Supreme
Court has noted [in Glover v. United States46] that its “jurisprudence
suggests that any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.” . . . Thus, our prejudice standard is in clear tension with Glover.
Certainly, “nothing in Glover suggests that a non-capital defendant must
receive the maximum available sentence in order to demonstrate prejudice.” . . . It is time to reexamine our reliance on this impossible prejudice standard.47

It is not clear how the supreme court started with the sentencing problem in Young48 and reached the conclusion that an appellant cannot establish
prejudice absent a maximum sentence. True, appellate courts do not reverse
absent a showing of prejudice.49 And because the Arkansas Rules of Evidence protect the sanctity of jury deliberations,50 it would be difficult to
42. Id., 510 S.W.3d at 777.
43. Id. at 1, 510 S.W.3d at 776.
44. Id., 510 S.W.3d at 776.
45. State v. Thompson, 2017 Ark. 50, 7–8, 510 S.W.3d at 780.
46. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198 (2001).
47. Thompson, 2017 Ark. 50, at 12–13, 510 S.W.3d at 782 (Hart, J., dissenting) (internal
citations omitted).
48. Young v. State, 287 Ark. 361, 363, 699 S.W.2d 398, 399 (1985) (per curiam) (holding that there was no prejudicial error when a defendant’s sentence was within both the erroneous range given to the jury and the correct range provided under the law).
49. See, e.g., Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996).
50. See ARK. R. EVID. 606(b) (West, Westlaw through November 1, 2017) (“Upon an
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything
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conclude with reasonable certainty what effect any error would have on the
jury’s sentencing decision. However, the supreme court has acknowledged
the obvious when it comes to the State’s introduction of evidence: “Of
course, it is likely that evidence offered by the state will be prejudicial to an
accused, or it probably would not be offered.”51 If it is introduced, then it is
probably prejudicial.52 And if it is prejudicial, then a jury will likely consider
it when assessing a sentence, as the prosecutor intends. Some may argue that
the appellate courts should not speculate about the possible effect of an improper argument when that effect could be minimal. But even a minimally
prejudicial remark by a prosecutor should be considered when determining
the fairness of a defendant’s sentence. After all, every day that a defendant
spends in jail counts.
There have been a few occasions after Young and Buckley when the
appellate court reversed despite the defendant not being sentenced to the
maximum. When it comes to the habitual offender statute, the supreme court
does not require a maximum sentence in order to establish prejudice. In Vanesch v. State,53 the State erroneously introduced the appellant’s juvenile
delinquency record for the purpose of seeking a habitual offender sentencing
enhancement. The appellant’s sentence was less than the maximum for nonhabitual sentences.54 The Arkansas Court of Appeals held that the appellant
failed to show prejudice, citing the familiar maxim and rejecting the appellant’s reliance on Rogers, previously mentioned in this article.55 But probation was available for some of the appellant’s offenses, and the supreme
court explained, “[W]e know that the trial judge in sentencing Vanesch departed from the sentencing grid and sentenced Vanesch as a habitual offender on all three felony counts. We can only speculate what impact the inadmissible prior juvenile delinquency adjudication played in enhancing Vanesch’s sentences.”56 It then remanded the case for resentencing.57
In addition, the decision to run multiple sentences concurrently or consecutively belongs to the trial judge.58 However, the mechanical acceptance
of the jury’s recommendation without the exercise of discretion is reversible

upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from
the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith[.]”).
51. Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 542, 609 S.W.2d 898, 909 (1980); accord Morris v.
State, 367 Ark. 406, 240 S.W.3d 593 (2006).
52. Id.
53. Vanesch v. State, 343 Ark. 381, 37 S.W.3d 196 (2001).
54. Id. at 386, 37 S.W.3d at 199.
55. See Vanesch v. State, 70 Ark. App. 277, 283, 16 S.W.3d 306, 310–11. Supra Part II.
56. Vanesch, 343 Ark. at 390–91, 37 S.W.3d at 202.
57. Id. at 391, 37 S.W.3d at 202.
58. Lawhon v. State, 327 Ark. 675, 940 S.W.2d 475 (1997) (citing Hadley v. State, 322
Ark. 472, 910 S.W.2d 675 (1995)).
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error.59 A defendant need not be sentenced to the maximum in such cases.
Finally, a sentence must be within the range provided by statute.60 Not only
is a sentence outside the statutory range reversible error, it is a matter that
the appellate court must raise sua sponte.61
Otherwise, the Arkansas appellate courts have held steadfastly to the
rule that an appellant cannot show prejudice absent a maximum sentence.62
Most of these cases can be traced back to Tate, Buckley, or Young itself.
Thus, with every decision involving a defendant sentenced to less than the
maximum, Arkansas appellate courts compound the unsupported maxim that
a defendant is not prejudiced by the sentence until the jury gives the maximum sentence for an offense.
IV. ARKANSAS IS UNIQUE IN ITS APPROACH
Arkansas’s requirement of a maximum sentence as a prerequisite is an
anomaly, when comparing it to the other states that use jury sentencing in
non-capital cases. Like Arkansas, the states of Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia have jury sentencing in non-capital cases.63 None
of them provide the barriers on sentencing appeals that Arkansas courts do.
A.

Kentucky

Like Arkansas, Kentucky courts require a showing of prejudice before
remanding a case for resentencing.64 This may be an easy showing in cases
where the jury gives the defendant a maximum sentence. For example, the
defendant was able to make such a showing in Blane v. Commonwealth,65
where the prosecutor introduced evidence of charges that were subsequently
amended.66
59. Id. (citing Acklin v. State, 270 Ark. 879, 606 S.W.2d 594 (1980)).
60. See, e.g., Barber v. State, 2016 Ark. 54, 482 S.W.3d 314.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Holley v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 557, 444 S.W.3d 889 (alleging an evidentiary error); Stover v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 393, 437 S.W.3d 699 (alleging an evidentiary
error); Walden v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 307, 419 S.W.3d 746 (alleging an evidentiary error);
Gill v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 524, 376 S.W.3d 537 (alleging an improper closing argument);
Bond v. State, 374 Ark. 332, 288 S.W.3d 206 (2008) (alleging an erroneous jury instruction).
63. See Caleb R. Stone, Sentencing Roulette: How Virginia’s Criminal Sentencing System is Imposing an Unconstitutional Trial Penalty that Suppresses the Rights of Criminal
Defendants to a Jury Trial, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 559 (2014). See also Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 314 (2003) (noting that thirteen
states had jury sentencing in non-capital cases in 1960).
64. See KY. R. CRIM. P. 10.26 (West, Westlaw through January 1, 2018).
65. Blane v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.3d 140, 151–52 (Ky. 2012).
66. The appellant was successful on this argument despite failing to raise it before the
trial court. Unlike many states and the federal judiciary, Arkansas has no “plain-error” rule,
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But even when the potential additional time is relatively minimal, the
Kentucky appellate courts recognize the possibility of prejudice. For example, the appellant in Jackson v. Commonwealth67 was sentenced to ten years
in prison.68 During the sentencing phase, the prosecutor erroneously told the
jury that the appellant would be eligible for parole after serving fifteen percent of his sentence.69 The Commonwealth argued that the misstatement was
harmless, as it only amounted to a six-month difference. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals responded, “we note that while the six-month difference in
parole eligibility may seem insignificant to the Commonwealth, it is surely
significant to [the appellant] or anyone else who might have an additional
six months to serve in prison before being eligible for release.”70 In so holding, the court relied on the Supreme Court of Kentucky’s decision in Robinson v. Commonwealth.71 There, the jury heard incorrect testimony regarding
the use of “good time credits” in calculating parole eligibility.72 When assessing whether this false testimony had any effect on the jury’s decision to
render the maximum sentence, the court wrote, “We believe it did and, for
sure, can’t say it didn’t.”73 The court also reversed and remanded for resentencing in Williams v. Commonwealth74 when the prosecutor erroneously
introduced convictions that were still subject to appeal.75 Such an error affected the defendant’s status as a persistent felony offender.76 And in Offutt
v. Commonwealth,77 when the jury was not given an instruction on the appellant’s eligibility for parole, the Supreme Court of Kentucky commented,
“While we may doubt whether absent the inaccuracy the result would have
been more favorable to the defendant, we decline to speculate, and conclude
that resentencing is in order.”78 While many reported appeals in Kentucky
are from maximum sentences, language from the Kentucky appellate courts
confirms that the courts are willing to do a true “harmless error” analysis
and exceptions to the requirement of raising the issue before the trial court are rare. See generally Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980).
67. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 2011 WL 112427 (Ky. App. Jan. 14, 2011) (unpublished
opinion).
68. Id. at *1.
69. Id. at *4 (noting that the defendant would not have been eligible until he served
twenty percent of his sentence).
70. Id. at *5.
71. Robinson v. Commonwealth, 181 S.W.3d 30 (Ky. 2005).
72. Id. at 38. The jury was told that the good time credits would be figured into the defendant’s parole eligibility. Id. However, the appellate court explained that a defendant could
not get credit for that time until he reaches the minimum parole eligibility. Id.
73. Id.
74. Williams v. Commonwealth, 178 S.W.3d 491 (Ky. 2005).
75. Id. at 499.
76. Id.
77. Offutt v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 815 (Ky. 1990).
78. Id. at 817.
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rather than assume no prejudice results from sentences that are less than the
maximum.
B.

Missouri

Missouri also takes a different approach to sentencing appeals, though
it has some support for its position in Missouri statutory law. In State v.
Troya,79 the appellant challenged his ten-year sentence, arguing that the trial
court misunderstood the applicable sentencing range.80 The court thought
that the applicable range was ten-to-thirty years or life, when in fact it was
five-to-thirty years or life.81 Granted, the appellant in Troya was sentenced to
the perceived minimum, while the appellant in Young was not. However,
Missouri law clearly states:
A sentence passed on the basis of a materially false foundation lacks due
process of law and entitles the defendant to a reconsideration of the question of punishment in light of the true facts, regardless of the eventual
outcome. This is so even if it is likely the court will return the same sentence.82

Missouri courts require a showing of prejudice before reversing a sentence.83 The question is “whether there is a reasonable probability that the
jury would have imposed a lesser sentence but for the erroneously admitted
[evidence].”84 Further, when it comes to persistent offender status, Missouri
courts are willing to review it for plain error.85
Admittedly, there is one Missouri case, State v. Ray,86 where the court
found that the appellant could not show prejudice in part because he was
sentenced to less than the maximum.87 However, the court also considered
that the trial court ruled in the defendant’s favor when the State attempted to
charge him as a persistent offender.88

79. State v. Troya, 407 S.W.3d 695 (Mo. App. 2013).
80. Id. at 696.
81. Id. at 700.
82. Id. at 700. But see State v. Bommarito, 856 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Mo. App. 1993) (noting that, even if the court relied on the prosecutor’s erroneous statement of a ten-year minimum rather than a five-year minimum, there was evidence that the court would have still
sentenced the appellant to the maximum of thirty years).
83. State v. Fassero, 256 S.W.3d 109, 119 (Mo. 2008).
84. Id.
85. See State v. Nesbitt, 299 S.W.3d 26, 28 (Mo. App. 2009).
86. State v. Ray, 852 S.W.2d 165 (Mo. App. 1993).
87. Id. at 170.
88. Id.
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Oklahoma

Oklahoma code explicitly provides for reversals and remand on sentencing errors:
Upon any appeal of a conviction by the defendant in a noncapital criminal case, the appellate court, if it finds prejudicial error in the sentencing
proceeding only, may set aside the sentence rendered and remand the
case to the trial court in the jurisdiction in which the defendant was originally sentenced for resentencing. 89

In McIntosh v. State,90 a jury found the defendant guilty of trafficking
ecstasy.91 The court instructed the jury that the minimum sentence was thirty
years, and it sentenced the defendant to that minimum.92 The appellate court
later held that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the minimum was actually twelve years.93 While the court had to conduct a harmless-error review, there was no analysis of the maximum sentence:
In this instance, the erroneous instruction required the jury to sentence
McIntosh to a term of imprisonment at least eighteen years above the
minimum sentence prescribed by statute. With nothing but the bare verdict and the fact that the jury imposed the minimum sentence for the
range it was given, we have no basis to conclude that this jury would
have imposed the same thirty year sentence had it been properly instructed on the twelve year minimum. Consequently, we cannot conclude that
the error was harmless.94

There was no resentencing in this case. Instead, the court modified the
sentence to twelve years’ imprisonment.95
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ruled similarly in Ellis v.
State.96 There, a jury sentenced a robbery defendant to sixty years of imprisonment after being erroneously instructed of a twenty-year minimum.97 The
court subsequently reduced the defendant’s sentence to the actual minimum:
ten years.98 And in Lewallen v. State,99 the appellate court remanded for re-

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

22 OKLA. ST. ANN. § 929(A) (West, Westlaw through 2018).
McIntosh v. State, 237 P.3d 800 (Okla. Crim. App. 2010).
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 801.
Ellis v. State, 749 P.2d 114 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
Id. at 115.
Id. at 116.
Lewallen v. State, 2016 OK CR 4, 370 P.3d 828.
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sentencing when the defendant was subjected to a twenty-year minimum
sentence rather that the correct four-year minimum.100
One thing that makes these Oklahoma cases persuasive is that the defendants were similarly situated to the defendant in Young, who was subjected to a higher minimum sentence because of an incorrect jury instruction. Where the Supreme Court of Arkansas ruled that there was no prejudicial error because the sentence was still within the valid range, Oklahoma
courts still reviewed the record for harmless error.
D.

Texas

Texas clearly does not require a maximum sentence before considering
a sentencing error. For example, in Harding v. State,101 a robbery defendant
was sentenced to sixty years, far below the maximum range of life imprisonment.102 The error involved instructions related to parole eligibility.103 In
reviewing the sentence, the court explained:
[T]he prosecutor did indeed direct the jury to consider the § 4(a) instruction—not once but twice—to decide “how are we going to protect society against that man.” . . . “[An argument] made in terms tending to induce consideration of the eligibility formula and other teachings of a § 4
instruction compounds Rose error and may influence the jury in its deliberations on punishment.” . . . Certainly such was his stated purpose
and that “alone or coupled with other indicia in the record” can create
implications of harm. . . .
Another indicator is the term of years assessed: “it serves somewhat as a
barometric measure of other pressures ... likely to influence the jury in
assessing punishment.” . . . The Houston [1st] Court itself has made the
point that even without an explanation from counsel jurors are capable of
calculating effect of what it calls the “one-third rule” and then “fixing a
term of years to compensate for parole eligibility.” . . . Experience
proves the point has merit. . . .
However, in this cause the court seems to take the view that a term of
sixty years is “mid-range” punishment, thus somehow suggesting
harmless error. The fact of the matter is that under § 4(a) sixty years is
the minimum term that must be assessed in order to achieve the maximum delay in parole eligibility. . . . So, as we demonstrated in Arnold,
“it is not enough to say that a § 4 instruction made no contribution to
punishment merely because the term assessed is ‘mid-range’ relative to
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 828–29.
Harding v. State, 790 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
Id. at 639.
Id.
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the potential maximum.” . . . The burden is on the State to show beyond
reasonable doubt that it did not. . . . “The evil to be avoided is the consideration by the jury of parole in assessing punishment.” . . . We conclude that a rational appellate court could not determine and declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in allowing jurors to consider aspects of parole law stated in the § 4(a) instruction did not influence the
jury adversely to appellant in assessing punishment, . . . that it made no
contribution to punishment assessed against appellant. 104

In other words, there is no automatic rejection of the appeal simply for
lack of a maximum sentence.105 True, the burden of proof regarding harmless error is different, with the Texas court putting the burden of proof on
the State to establish harmless error and Arkansas courts normally placing
that burden on the appellant to show prejudice.106 But the essential point is
still clear: a sentence far short of the maximum can be prejudicial.
The decision in Brown v. State107 is likewise instructive. There, the
prosecutor committed error by comparing the defendant to Jeffrey Dahmer,
John Wayne Gacy, and Ted Bundy.108 The defendant was sentenced to sixty
years; the maximum potential term was life.109 The court acknowledged the
difficulty in assessing the effect of the prosecutor’s statement:
In sum, the determination of harm is little more than a matter of educational guess. What the jurors actually thought persuasive or actually considered is seldom, if ever, available to us. So, we peruse the record to assess potentialities. And, in assessing the potentialities at bar, we are unable to say that the cumulative effect of each instance of misconduct was
nil or only slight. It may be that appellant’s acts merited a lengthy prison
sentence but that is something which the jury below was to decide free of
1) suggestion about what the court would do if it were levying punishment and 2) allusion to several of the most notorious murderers in recent
memory. Appellant is not entitled to a perfect trial, but he is entitled to at
least one tolerably fair.110

In short, harmless-error analysis may be a challenge and may require
effort, but it can be done even when the defendant is not sentenced to the
maximum.111

104. Id. at 640–41 (internal citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Shreck v. State, 2017 Ark. 39, 5, 510 S.W.3d 750, 753.
107. Brown v. State, 978 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App. 1998).
108. Id. at 714.
109. Id. at 715.
110. Id. at 715–16 (citations and internal quotes omitted).
111. See also Sunbury v. State, 33 S.W.3d 436 (2000) (reversing a fifteen-year sentence,
five years short of the maximum).
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Virginia

The harmless-error analysis itself makes Virginia very different from
Arkansas. If there is an error related to a sentence, the sentence is reversed
unless it plainly appears that the error did not affect the sentence.112 This is
the opposite of Arkansas appellate procedure, where the appellant must
demonstrate prejudice in an appeal. Thus, a defendant who is sentenced to
less than the maximum has a chance for resentencing in the event of trial
court error.
V. A PROPOSAL
There is no justification for Arkansas’s blanket assumption that a criminal defendant cannot show prejudice if a jury has not given the maximum
sentence. The logic cannot be found in case law, and it is an approach that is
unique among the states that use jury sentencing for non-capital offenses.
One might argue that the rule has been so ingrained in Arkansas jurisprudence that the Supreme Court of Arkansas should not reverse it. The
court often reminds litigants that “[t]he policy behind stare decisis is to lend
predictability and stability to the law.”113 However, there are no reliance
issues here.114 Presumably, no defendant does anything to induce a jury to
hand down a sentence any greater than necessary. And no prosecutor blatantly disregards the rules in the hopes that the jury would hand down a stiff
sentence less than the maximum (or at least one would hope).
The bar for overcoming the application of stare decisis is high: a showing that “adherence to the principle . . . is manifestly unjust or patently
wrong.”115 However, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has stated, “[W]hen
governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, this Court has
never felt constrained to follow precedent. Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command; rather, it is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of
adherence to the latest decision.”116 The rule that a criminal defendant be
sentenced to the maximum before being able to show prejudice in the sen112. See Webb v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 466, 470, 524 S.E.2d 164, 166 (2000);
Resio v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 616, 623, 513 S.E.2d 892, 896 (1999).
113. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Barber, 356 Ark. 268, 287, 149 S.W.3d 325, 337 (2004). See
also Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n Inc., 344 Ark. 627, 641, 42 S.W.3d 508, 518 (2001); State
Office of Child Support Enf’t v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 343, 954 S.W.2d 907, 909 (1997).
114. See Franklin v. Healthsource of Ark., 328 Ark. 163, 173–74, 942 S.W.2d 837, 842–
43 (1997) (Imber, J., dissenting) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Parish v.
Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968)) (noting the importance of stare decisis in contract law, where parties rely on it before executing a document).
115. Engram v. State, 341 Ark. 196, 209, 15 S.W.3d 678, 685 (2000).
116. Zinger v. Terrell, 336 Ark. 423, 430–31, 985 S.W.2d 737, 741 (1999) (quoting
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828–29 (1991)).
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tencing phase of a trial is indeed badly reasoned. No interest is served by
mechanical application of that rule.
Some might also argue that a defendant would have difficulty showing
prejudice unless a jury had sentenced him or her to the maximum. This may
be true for several reasons. Even in cases that do not involve sentencing, a
court can only speculate as to the effect that any piece of evidence or argument may have on a jury. It may be easier to make inferences when the
question concerns guilt. There are a limited number of choices: guilty, guilty
on a lesser-included offense, or not guilty. When it comes to sentencing,
however, the jury has several options. What effect does an inflammatory
statement from the prosecutor have on a sentence? Could it increase a defendant’s sentence by ten percent? Fifty percent? One hundred percent?
There is no way to tell. But the difficulty in determining the effect of an
erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence or argument should not lead
to a blanket rule requiring a maximum sentence as a prerequisite for a showing of prejudice.
In her dissent in Thompson, mentioned in Part III of this article, Justice
Hart relied heavily on Professor Hessick’s comments in her article Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing.117 Professor Hessick has also remarked that
Arkansas courts “have not provided much of an explanation for the rule.” 118
She offers a few possible reasons for the rule. One of them is a lack of entitlement to any particular sentence within a discretionary sentencing
scheme.119 If a defendant is not entitled to a particular sentence, then he cannot show prejudice when appealing from the sentence alone.120 But the professor rejects this argument easily; under such circumstances, a defendant
would not even be able to show prejudice from a maximum sentence.121 On
its face, that does not seem fair to the defendant.
Finally, the refusal to review errors for sentences that are less than the
maximum ignores the significance of every day spent behind bars. This reality was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States in RosalesMireles v. United States.122 The defendant in that case was convicted of illegal reentry into the United States.123 The Probation Office submitted a sentencing report that yielded a sentencing range of seventy-seven to ninety-six
months.124 Based on that report, the United States District Court for the
117. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C.L. REV. 1069
(2009). Supra Part III.
118. Id. at 1092.
119. See id. at 1093–94.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1091.
122. Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897 (2018).
123. Id. at 1905.
124. Id.
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Western District of Texas sentenced the defendant to seventy-eight
months.125 However, the Probation Office’s report contained an error that
affected the calculation of the sentencing range, and a proper calculation
would have yielded a range of seventy to eighty-seven months.126 Worse yet,
the defendant did not catch the error before sentencing.127
The defendant raised the issue before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Because this was the first time the defendant
raised the issue, the Fifth Circuit reviewed for plain error.128 Again, unlike
Arkansas law, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) allows for review
of plain error even if not raised at the district court level.129 The Fifth Circuit
held that it had the discretion to correct the District Court’s error,130 but it
declined to do so.131 To reverse plain error under federal law, the court must
hold that “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”132 Because the defendant’s seventy-eightmonth sentence fell within the correct sentencing range, the Fifth Circuit
held that neither the error nor the sentence “would shock the conscience.”133
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the Fifth
Circuit was too restrictive when it declined to reverse the error.134 While
much of the Rosales-Mireles holding is inapplicable to Arkansas, due to its
rejection of a plain-error rule, the Supreme Court provided wise words as it
relates to a defendant’s sentence.
”[W]hen a defendant is sentenced under an incorrect Guidelines range—
whether or not the defendant’s ultimate sentence falls within the correct
range—the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show a
reasonable probability of a different outcome absent the error .”. . . In
other words, an error resulting in a higher range than the Guidelines provide usually establishes a reasonable probability that a defendant will
serve a prison sentence that is more than “necessary” to fulfill the purposes of incarceration. . . . “To a prisoner,” this prospect of additional
“time behind bars is not some theoretical or mathematical concept.” . . .
“[A]ny amount of actual jail time” is significant, . . . and “ha[s] excep125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1905–1906.
129. Compare to Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980).
130. Before correcting plain error under Rule 52(b), an appellate court must find that the
error (1) “[has] not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned,” (2) “be plain—that is to
say, clear or obvious,” and (3) “affect[s] the defendant’s substantial rights.” Rosales-Mireles,
138 S. Ct. at 1904 (quoting Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1342 (2016)).
131. Id. at 1905.
132. Id. (quoting Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1342).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1904–1911.
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tionally severe consequences for the incarcerated individual [and] for society which bears the direct and indirect costs of incarceration.” . . . The
possibility of additional jail time thus warrants serious consideration in a
determination whether to exercise discretion under Rule 52(b). It is crucial in maintaining public perception of fairness and integrity in the justice system that courts exhibit regard for fundamental rights and respect
for prisoners “as people.”135

To summarize, even when considering what might be perceived as a
relatively short amount of time to someone who is not incarcerated, sentencing errors involving months in prison ought to be fully considered by the
appellate court. Arkansas’s rule requiring a maximum sentence before holding that there could be a showing of prejudice goes against this reality.
The solution is simple. At its next opportunity, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas should hold that a defendant could be prejudiced from an error
related to sentencing even though he or she received a sentence less than the
maximum. It might be difficult to determine the prejudice resulting from
any error from sentencing, but the author would recommend the harmlesserror analysis announced by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Harris
v. State136 and applied in sentencing appeals in Enos v. State:137
[T]he court should examine the source of the error, the nature of the error, whether or to what extent it was emphasized by the State, and its
probable collateral implications. Further, the court should consider how
much weight a juror would probably place upon the error. In addition,
the Court must also determine whether declaring the error harmless
would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity. In summary, the
reviewing court should focus not on the weight of the other evidence of
guilt, but rather on whether the error at issue might possibly have prejudiced the jurors’ decision-making; it should ask not whether the jury
reached the correct result, but rather whether the jurors were able properly to apply law to facts in order to reach a verdict. Consequently, the reviewing court must focus upon the process and not on the result. In other
words, a reviewing court must always examine whether the trial was an
essentially fair one. If the error was of a magnitude that it disrupted the
juror’s orderly evaluation of the evidence, no matter how overwhelming
it might have been, then the conviction is tainted. Again, it is the effect
of the error and not the other evidence that must dictate the reviewing
court’s judgment.138

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1907 (internal citations omitted).
Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim App. 1989).
Enos v. State, 909 S.W.2d 293, 295 (1995).
Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 587–88.
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As for what to do about a tainted sentence, Arkansas case law already
provides a solution: if the error affects the sentence only, the appellate court
can give the Attorney General the choice of accepting the minimum sentence or having the case remanded for a new sentencing hearing.139
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear: “any amount
of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment significance.”140 Even if an error
increases a defendant’s time in jail by a few months, that time still matters.
Current Arkansas appellate jurisprudence fails to acknowledge this reality.
There is no good reason for holding as a matter of law that a defendant be
sentenced to the maximum before being able to show prejudice. Further, no
other state with jury sentencing in non-capital cases has this rule. Simply
put, it is time for the Supreme Court of Arkansas to eliminate this rule from
its jurisprudence, thus opening the door for a true review of sentencing errors in Arkansas.

139. See supra notes 4–16 and accompanying text.
140. Glover, 531 U.S. at 203.

